Pacific Islands got a taste of the RASTER Method in support of E-Resilience

The ESCAP Asia Pacific Information Superhighway (AP-IS) steering committee meeting, this past August in Bangkok, heard us present the need for an inventory of E-Resilience tools.  Among the list of recommended concepts was the Risk Assessment and Step-wise Refinement (RASTER) methodology; one that caught ESCAP's attention. The tool and its participatory approach reveals "black swans", in telecommunications, to then derive policies and procedures for mitigating those low frequency high impact vulnerabilities.

Having realized the utility, ESCAP invited us to introduce the RASTER method to participants of the Subregional workshop on the implementation of the AP-IS and SDGs in Pacific Islands (19-23 Aug 2018, Nadi, Fiji). The participants went through a half day session, designed to introduce case studies, theory, tools and methods on E-Resilience. We confined the scope to emergency communication (or disaster communication). Within that scope we exercised three activities:

1. Sharing participant experiences of telecom outages during disasters.
2. Trialing a questionnaire designed to realize the necessary components of a working and effective Business Contingency Plan (BCP)
3. Hands-on with the RASTER tool

All three activities converged on realizing and understanding how to use simple tools in achieving E-Resilience.

For part of the RASTER Exercise, we used a real world case of the updated Suva-Fiji Tsunami siren warning system. The diagram shows the UHF-based siren triggering system and the respective RASTER analysis. Through the RASTER exercises, the participants found that signal weakness, physical damage to hardware & wires, and stable main-grid and adequate battery power were the significant shortcomings.

It is important that E-Resilience consider a systems approach; where power systems, for example, are imperative. It requires considering all stakeholders and dependencies as well. Moreover, investigating the damage, congestion, and jamming type factors affecting single and common component failures.

The participants trialed the questionnaire designed to assist in realizing the business continuity readiness. One would typically exercise this questionnaire with the depended Telecos or their own institutions, for example. The "cloud" component, in RASTER, is used when there's ambiguity of the the actual internal system mechanics of a system. It could be a UHF relay network, as in the example of remotely triggering the siren towers. The business contingency readiness questionnaire becomes resourceful in understanding the reliability of this cloud service and prevailing Black Swans.

What we learned from the unofficial results of the experimental exercise conducted with members of ICT apex and Regulatory bodies is that:

• Samoa and Solomon Islands claim to have well established BCP requirements with trained personnel, institutionalized procedures, and having identified all communication priorities and components.
• All other member state institutions have management procedures; but the they fall short in implementing the necessary elements for making their communication resilient.
• A key element is that none of them, except for Solomon Islands, have fully tested telecom emergency recovery procedures
• Only Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Tuvalu have established mechanisms to be aware of threats and relay those to the response teams for activating any kind of response procedures. The others either have partial or no mechanism to alert of events or threats.

The evidence of their readiness can be matched with the Participant stories - 2015 Cyclone Pam was a common experience and a point of reference, for most of them. The category 5 cyclone plowed through Vanuatu, with 200km/h winds, damaging all their telecoms. It also affected their neighbours. Although the cyclone path maps show it to die north of Vanuatu, the effects reached as far as the southern outer islands of Kiribati, close to Tuvalu. The strong tsunami like waves damaged their only Speedcast VSAT link but now replaced with a Kasific link.

Most outer islands, of all Pacific Islands, are shy of 3GPP-based internet. The small populations makes it difficult for the Islands to build a lucrative business case to lure investors. The economic struggles, Small Island Developing States face, makes it difficult for them to subsidize the role out. To compensate, VHF radios are the only mode to stay connected with Island Councils.

E-Resilience in support of Emergency Communications

United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN-ESCAP), and their Asia Pacific Information Superhighway (AP-IS) initiative, might consider offering their member states:

Emergency Communications
Resiliency Stack

1. A set of tools and methodologies for technology stewards to assess their own E-Resilience in their organizations and communities; then, supply the quantitative and qualitative findings to include in an AP-IS database for researchers and practitioners to use in analyzing national, cross-boarder, and regional strategies for addressing E-Resilience.
2. Best-practices for developing community centered communications networks with options for reliable and proven back-haul and interconnection; along with their resilience to various disaster, geographic and socioeconomic constraints.
3. Guidelines for building Business Continuity - Disaster Recovery Plans (BC-DRPs) that comply with emergency communications requirements; taking into consideration survivability & availability and Rapid Restoration of Access to Telecommunication (RReAcT) programs

These were three key recommendations contributed to the 2nd session of the AP-IS steering committee and WSIS regional review meeting held 27th & 28th September 2018, UN Conference Center in Thailand. The event was a precursor to the Committee on Information and Communications Technology & Science, Technology and Innovation, Second session.

The main contribution, of my talk, was to cover E-Resilience: i.e. resilient ICT networks (or better termed as "ICT services"), Support for disaster management systems, and ensuring last-mile disaster communication. The AP-IS initiative aims to enhance the resilience of existing/planned ICT infrastructure through methods such as enhanced network diversity, while recognizing the importance of resilient infrastructure to sustainable development and the critical role played by ICT in disaster risk reduction and management.

VIEW SLIDES - e-Resilience in support of Emergency Communication: “contingencies" 

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1. Telecom Resilience Analysis Tools and Methodologies

ITU has mapped the undersea and terrestrial networks and interconnections. Member states may officially request for the underlying raw GIS data? However, the raw data is unavailable for the public (researchers and practitioners) for any kind of augmented analysis. For example, we can apply simple max-flow min-cut or dynamic flow algorithms to determine the optimal resiliency strategies. Open data for resilience initiatives is highly advocated by the  Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDR).

ITU's data can be used in a tools such as the Sahana Community Resilience Mapping Tool (CRMT) implemented for the Los Angeles County. The Sahana CRMT would use the inherent capabilities to overlay risk maps (hazard, vulnerability, and exposure GIS data) with the ITU infrastructure GIS data to analyze the vulnerabilities and then manage the mitigation plans on the telecom infrastructure. Moreover, it would allow for member states to manage and update their own jurisdictional information sets for the greater good.

Another effective tool and methodology is the Risk Assessment and Step-wise Refinement (RASTER). The tool allows for organizations and communities to model their critical infrastructure. It uses 5 basic components: actor, wireless, wired, equipment, and cloud (unknown) to link them and model the system architecture. Thereafter, apply a participatory approach to define the frequency of various threats and the impact (based on a likert scale) on the individual components that enable the service(s). The tool analyzes the data to, then, propose "quick win" mitigation strategies of the single and common points of failure. It is a simple and easy to use tools; free for all to adopt. LIRNEasia, recently, demonstrated the use of the tool and engaged participants in analyzing a scenario at APrIGF2018.

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2a. Community Networks for bridging the Last-Mile

While Government and International Humanitarian Organizations may have access to various satellite (e.g. VSAT), high altitude platform (e.g. facebook's Aquila), and terrestrial technologies, the Public is limited to 3GPP and ADSL technologies. Community networks are emerging as ways for extending the Internet to the marginalized. However, such community networks must be resilient to secure the continuity of essential public services. Moreover, they should also be sustainable and serve as an economically viable resource for the RReAcTs. LIRNEasia, along with UN-ESCAP, ISOC, and AIT IntERLab, demonstrated such a resilient community network-based RReAcT solution at APrIGF2017.

Source: AIT IntERLAb CWMN

The demonstrated solution was based on an AIT IntERLab home-brewed mesh-network. The technology adopts a simple business model to connect marginalized communities. Basically, IntERLab floated startup: Taknet buys unlimited capacity for THB 750/mo per access point from the ISP. Thereafter, they optimally redistribute that capacity in the community. TakNet charges each user, accessing the pasticular community network, THB 250/mo. That generates enough income to support a Technician in the community and the upkeep of the hardware (routers and access points).

We also heard from CViSNET about the Nippon Telegraph and Telephon’s Movable Deployable Resource Unity (MDRU); developed after the 2011 Japan Earthquake and used in 2013 Cyclone Haiyan in the Philippines. The MDRU turnkey solution, especially the grab-n-go suitcase is quite versatile for rapidly restoring telecoms. It is capable on latching on to any 3GPP or ADSL back-haul to offer voice and data services.

Besides supporting RReAcT, the community networks serve a supplementary contribution to the AP-IS pillar: “broadband for all”. The initiative aims to bridge the digital divide, promote affordable access to under-served areas, and policy and technical support to Governments. Asia Pacific Network Information Center (APNIC) and the Internet Society (ISOC) are key advocates of community networks and are jointly investing resources in expanding such community networks.

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2b. The Back-haul, critical single point of failure

Reporting delays since day of earthquake;
mountain areas of Nepal.

The last-mile community networks heavily rely on a single ISP back-haul and that is their weakest link. What we have realized from various studies, including our most recent report from the 2015 Nepal Earthquake, was ISP’s did not have good contingencies to quickly bounce back from disasters.
For example, an analysis, making use of large volumes of relevant social media data and a density-based clustering algorithm, revealed that it was not until the 4th day (pass the "72 golden hour") that public reports started coming in. The map to the left shows foot soldiers had to hike from one village to another to transmit incident reports.

A similar study in India learned that during the 2014 Jammu & Kashmir floods, one telco's base station equipment was submerged but the other's, on the second flood was unharmed. Although both telcos agreed to share the infrastructure, as per the Indian "intra circle roaming agreement" it took their engineers a day and a half to configure the systems to revive services; still that was 15 days after the onset of the flood.

We have also learned that point-to-point WiMax (2.4 & 5.2 GHz) for mountainous areas, LTE (700 MHz band) radio for Mars like terrain, and LEO satellites for small islands are proven as best-practices. Long distance point-to-point works well between mountains in the absence of obstacles. High frequency radio waves work well in the presence of obstacles but limits the distance. WiMax and LTE nodes require very little power. Nepal study revealed that service providers were able restart services using solar powered batteries and make-shift bamboo hoists for antennas. Why not have these configurations ready on a USB stick for quick plug-n-play?

TV White Space is emerging as an alternative for back-haul. Koreans, specifically the company Innonet, have working solutions that use TV White Space, proven economical, to use with specific surveillance solutions; i.e. networks of CCTV cameras. There are many such solutions that ESCAP AP-IS might consider classifying and documenting as best-practices for member states to consider as solutions in their emergency communications plans.

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3. BC-DRP and Key Indicators for assessing the effectiveness

For survivability & availability and RReAct programs to come together, there is a need for practical and proven BC-DRPs. For such there is a growing need for guidelines, best-practices, and checklists to ensure telecom service provider meet emergency communication standards; typically stronger than normal business contingency plans. It would also require revised language in "service level agreements" between providers and regulators.

Components and inter-dependencies of ICT resilience
in support of emergency communications.

ICT Resilience in support of emergency communication requires near 100% survivability & availability and RReAcT programs to support real-time data streams for enabling a Common Operating Picture for emergency services and the public. Survivability and availability is a function of the telecommunications exposure to risk and risks, as we know, are inevitable. Therefore, telecommunications service providers must establish practical and proven BC-DRPs with sturdy telecom services and complementing RReAcT programs. For such, “key risk indicators” (KRIs) and “key performance indicators” (KPIs) must be established and agreed upon with the service levels set forth by emergency communications planners.


BC-DRP is a combination of preparedness and response with practical & proven plans. Preparedness must secure the continuity of the ICT services by setting KRIs that govern the survivability and availability. It is determined by realizing the incident “frequencies” and “impact” on the essential emergency services, then mitigating those vulnerabilities. One may apply a 80/20 rule to define factors: congestion, damage/break, power, interference, etc. Implementers must also include “social risk” in the KRIs as well. Typical social risks consider the affects on children, women, & elderly, trust in public goods, the amount of fear, so on.

KPIs are, typically, defined by the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) & Mean Time To Repair or Recovery (MTTR). Some chose to use Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) instead of MTTF. Ideally, the sum of MTTF (or MTBF) and MTTR must be zero (MTTF + MTTR = 0). However, it is practically impossible, given that we live in a world full of uncertainties. Therefore, national emergency communication planners may define their national MTTR to be less than 08 hours. To achieve such an ambitious KPI one must partner with various stakeholders. For example, agree with the domestic aviation industry to provide emergency transportation of communications equipment in time of a crisis.

The response component, of a BC-DRP, should consider a solid RReAcT program that make economic sense. That is achieved by setting the Recovery Time Objectives (RTOs). The RTOs must consider the human factors that are often neglected. Best-practice is to set service-based recovery times (e.g. Data first and Voice last or vise versa). Secondly, Recovery Point Objectives (RPOs) prioritize essential services; i.e. which organizations in the geographic locations must attain what capacity.

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Conclusion

There is a lot to be achieved, if we are "to leave no one behind". AP-IS seems to be gaining momentum with setting steppingstones and building pathways to intertwine the essential resources and support from the member states. We are committed to AP-IS and would work with ESCAP in providing our expertise in bridging the gaps; especially, in the areas of the 3 key recommendations prescribed at the onset of this blog.

Sahana First Response Prototype is Ready

There is a global increase in climate-related, anthropological, and technological disasters. information communication technology has proven to reduce the complexities of managing multiple situations, improve the incident response efficiencies, and promote accountability. The Sahana First Response (SaFiRe) enterprise solution, along with its mobile applications, can be combined to manage the location and situation specific information exchange.

SaFiRe is designed to support a Simple All-Hazard Emergency Operation Center (EOC); especially during the 72 hour golden window. An EOC might utilize SaFiRe for managing simple incidents like burglary, accident, dispute. The response and resources dispatched to an incident varies upon the scenario. An extreme event such as an earthquake, with many casualties, damages, and losses would require managing a large volume of response activities. All these, whether big or small, require managing a series of response actions (or inactions) and sharing information with a Multi-Agency Coordination System (MACS).

A SaFiRe prototype was developed to test the various scenarios and context drawn from several experiences. The code is available as a Sahana Template in the Eden repository. We will continue to imprve SaFiRe. It would be most effective with an actual implementation, although the prototype can be demonstrated for ICS requirements.

Spot contributions to policy paper wins first prize at ITU conference

We presented our paper on the “intricacies of implementing the ITU-T X.1303 recommended warning standard for cross-agency situational-awareness in Myanmar, Philippines, and Maldives at ITU Kaleiderscope (2016). It is an IEEE conference sponsored by the Telecommunication Standardization Bureau (TSB). The paper was not technical in the strict sense but discussed ICT policy relevant findings that the conference reviewers perceived important for the standardization process and the standards community. We were awarded “the best paper”. READ THE FULL STORY.

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State of Nepal's Emergency Comms, after the 2015 Gorkha Earthquake

With the assistance of LIRNEasia, we carried out a comprehensive evaluation of Nepal's Emergency Communication; August 2015 - April 2016. The report was presented at INET-Kathmandu.

The key message that I delivered was that for any Information Technology to triumph during crises and emergencies (shown by the green pinnacle in image to the left), a sturdy foundation of ICT resilience is compulsory. Robust infrastructure is the shouldering basis for ICT resilience. Thus, roads for engineers to travel to fix ill-fated BTS and Transmissions and electricity to power the telecommunications are essential elements for keeping the ICTs alive.

The venn diagram, to the right, illustrates the elements contributing to “Resilient Emergency Communication”. Robustness requires ensuring survivabilty and availability of the telecoms; especially a Government Emergency Communications (GECO). The GECO weaknesses are complemented by a Rapid Restoration of Access to Telecommunications (RREACT) program. The two complementing elements contribute to an effective Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Plan (BC-DRP).

DOWNLOAD THE REPORT

Training of SAMBRO Master Trainers in Thailand

Sahana Alerting and Messaging Broker (SAMBRO) continues to mature; especially with the Maldives, Myanmar, and Philippine implementations. Trainees from the three countries belonging to their Meteorological and Disaster Management Agencies are receiving training. They will receive training on GIS concepts, techniques, and tools required for developing predefined alert areas and training on administering, configuring, and implementing the CAP-enabled SAMBRO software. The training is part of the ‘CAP on a Map‘ project aiming to improve institutional responsiveness to coastal hazards.

Relevant Resources

• Training curriculum
• Beginning of the training
• After the first week
• Final day with ESCAP

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Femtocells (MicroBTS) in support of Emergency Communications

I raised a question with several on-line interest groups: Disaster Management India and Researchers and Disaster Management Professionals and Research. It was intended to understand the real value of the Femtocell (also referred to as Picocell or Microcell) technology in emergency communications. Has there been a significant uptake of the Femtocell technology in emergency communications?

Image http://tinyurl.com/oxkclcd

The technology has been around for about ten years. It was developed for commercial wireless telecom carriers to extend their coverage in locations where construction of a full size mobile tower is not warranted or economically justifiable. They are low power, short range (< 100m), and serve between 1-5 simultaneous connections. Ones made for small business or farm use can control up to about 100 users. However, they typically aren't big enough as currently sold to support a major emergency operation [1].

A small deployment, in a disaster affected area, could serve the public in small batches allowing them to reach their loved one. The Federal Communication Commission of USA has discussed the use of Femtocells as a Public Safety Tech. US telcom operator AT&T supports some mini systems that they use for their own emergency deployments and also offer to emergency management teams. The suitcase size,  bigger than Femtocells, AT&T solutions can support 500-1500 users simultaneously. Depending on the bandwidth available they do a decent job, at least with voice.

Image from EMF Explained Series: http://tinyurl.com/ovjrcot

Femtocells are Micro Base Transceiver System (Micro BTS). The mobile phone connects to a small local Femtocell device about the size of your WiFi modem as if it would to a regular GSM/WCDMA cellular tower. That device then provides voice and data to your cell phone where it otherwise wouldn't be able to pick up a signal out of the air. Cost of the device is under $100. David Kebo Houngninou explains the technicalities and architecture of setting up a cost-effective Femtocell access point.

Pasquale Pace and Valeria Loscri published on the architecture of OpenBTS as another step forward towards establishing cost-effective Micro BTS solutions. Range Networks has primarily customized the openBTS platform for a Network in a box kind of offering. They have a handful of implementations in various parts of the world: Antarctica, Indonesia, and Zambia. Folks at Daes and Orangee have discussed their practical experience of implementing a OpenBTS-enabled Microcell.

Extreme arid terrain: http://tinyurl.com/mjg3fgb

In the wake of a disaster, like an earthquake that may take out the towers and cables, it may take the telcos, at least, 48 hours to restore those BTS. The earthquake may cause landslides that may block the roads for Cells on Wheels  (COWs) to reach the cellular dark area. Some areas can be unmotorable in  terrain with high mountains, deep valleys, rocky ground, and swampy lands. A Mobile Emergency Operation Centre (MEOC), similar to the DUNE2014 project with LTE broadband capable of transmitting video data, can be setup at a distance. Then the MEOC can extend the LTE internet connection to serve the Public at a distant location by linking them to a Femtocell.

Of cause there are legalities with frequency reuse by an unlicensed service provider. There must be roaming agreements between providers to use the same frequencies in the same area; i.e. multi-carrier compatibility to allow for a femtocell to communicate with handsets from different carriers. It doesn't affect or matter who's at the other end of the line. Government agencies have the authority to overpower those licensing barriers. A Micro BTS setup by a Government emergency service can certainly override those licensing issues. Another option is to offer a set of emergency frequency bands that any authorized service operator can use to operationalize a Micro BTS in the time of an emergency.

The back-haul can simply be a broadband (internet) link to pipe the cellular signal. For example, a VSAT connection can serve as back-haul in a cellular dark area caused by a disaster . However, one must be cautious of the latency that comes along with satellites back-haul. Moreover, it has to have some form of authentication to interface and establish routing of the call in both directions. Establishing a satellite link in between would likely fail because of latency and technical routing problems. Mobile phones require specific performance characteristics that are not one size fits all that can be accommodated by one system.

While Femtocells have certain challenges with operationalizing that are mainly due to policy and regulatory issues, it still is a promising technology for serving the gaps of filling the dark cellular coverage holes in support of crisis response and management.

Acknowledgement

My gratitude to the following people (listed in alphabetical order) for their contribution to the discussion that resulted in this blog

• Donovan Ferguson - National Engagement Manager at Ascom Integrated Wireless
• Doug Hanchard - President at Rapid Response Consulting
• Lane DeCamp - Strategic and Executive Management
• Tapan Roy - Entrepreneur : ICT for Development

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[1] Disaster Researchers and Disaster Management Professionals, LinkedIn Group. "Femtocells, who uses them?", consulted on the web: https://lnkd.in/dgBUmcC

[2] Disaster Management India, LinkedIn group. "Femtocells, who uses them?", consulted on the web: http://tinyurl.com/n6oroge

Embarking on a study of ICT use in Indian Emergency Communications

Image is from DownToEarth: http://tinyurl.com/l6tqhpa

2014 has been a busy year for Indian Emergency Managers. The Uttarakhan massive landslide, Jamu-n-Kashmir floods, Mumbai Stampede, GAIL gas pipeline explosion, Cyclone Hudhud are few of the many disasters they faced this year. Communications failed during these major crises. The Citizens and the Crisis Managers were disconnected without any telecommunications. Responders had no way of contacting remote Taluks and Hamlets to assess their situation. Local Officials couldn't contact State of Central Government to share their distress.

Realizing the shortcomings in the robustness of telecommunications in serving crises the Department of Telecommunications (DOT) of the Government of India and the International of Telecommunication Union are committed to intervene. I am honoured to be granted the opportunity to lead the study in determining the gaps and then recommending best-practices that can be leveraged in improving the Indian emergency communications.

The objectives are:

1. Evaluate the current situation of ICT use in Emergency Telecommunications; specifically in the preparedness and response components of a Disaster Management cycle.
2. Suggest optimal use of satellite and terrestrial systems to developed redundant stream-less communications by first assessing available ICT resources and processes to effectively meet the challenges.
3. Create ecosystems where investments made for deploying telecommunications infrastructures for economic development are also used for disaster response for public safety.
4. Challenges to bring in coordinated approach from different government departments, Service providers, private sector, intergovernmental organizations for effectiveness and quick response.
5. Recommend any areas that require capacity building, systems development, and procedures for resilience. Thereafter, provide best practices that would support those recommendations.

A primary activity is a mission to India. The meetings in New Delhi are scheduled from December 11th to December 18th and in Bangalore (State of Karanataka) from 19th to the 22nd December, 2014. Interviewees are planned with Resource Persons affiliated Community-based Organizations, United Nations Agencies, Private Entities, Special Interest Groups, and Government Organizations. The mission findings will be recorded in mission report.

Code-fest on early warning interoperability

The Code-fest around the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) was a gathering of early warning experts and the Sahana plus IT Industry. They used four CAP-enabled tools and three early warning issues as the basis for learning and experimenting interoperability. This event was an Indian Ocean Tsunami 10th (IOTX) Anniversary commemoration activity that followed from the CAP Jump Start and Implementation Workshops held in Negombo.

Teams and the Tools

Three distinct teams engaged with new software developments used three tools:
[Py-team] Sahana Eden CAP Broker (web2Py SAMBRO; work-in-progress)
[JAR-team] CAP Editer (Java/JavaScript capable of publishing RSS feeds)
[JS-team] HTML/JS/Py Smart-phone CAP Publisher

Eliot Christian (WMO) gave an overview of CAP and I (LIRNEasia) used the Sahana-Krakatoa(LAMP) CAP-enabled Alerting/Messaging Module, designed for training  and simulations, to demonstrate the typical work flows related to "alerting".

The teams had to engage in the predetermined activities:
(A) Integrate an RSS feed to deliver CAP messages
(D) Emulate the Google Alerthub
(B) Recommend features for the FIA Reference Service
(C) Discuss the design requirements for validating event specific data

 

Data exchanges with RSS

The main task of the three teams were to accomplish activity (A). However, there were renditions of activity A) that The Py-team, further dissolved in to three teams. Fran Boon's group (SSF) worked on the CAP import and Dmonic Konig's (AidIQ) group worked on the CAP export RSS feed. Both of these groups worked f2f at Orion City IT Park along side the other local and foreign participants. Another team with Pat Tressel (University of Washington), Ambar (Birala Technical College), and others were gathering virtually.

The JAR-team already had the RSS feed working before coming to the CAP Code-fest. A bit of improvising had the Java/JavaScript developers, lead by Ishan Ambanwela with automating the concatenation of a string derived from the , , and attributes, to produce the CAP ; typically used for back tracking the message to the originator. Another task was enhancing the software to accommodate multiple polygons with overlapping or disjoint characteristics. each polygon would be saved in a distinct segment of the CAP message to indicate the geographic areas of the targeted recipients.

Akila Ravihansa (WSO2) leading the C-team and working with Michael Randall (USGS Volcano Hazards Program) and Armond Zamanyan (Google Crisis Response) had the mobile CAP publisher to work with. They enhanced it to publish an RSS feed of the CAP message. That message was received by the Eden SAMBRO and confirmed to be importable. These efforts are to work towards developing a Alerthub similar to the one that Google Crisis Response has to offer. The challenge is that Google Alerthub is live and does not provide a platform for Alerting Authorities to test their integrations for delivering CAP messages through Google to the public such as Now+ alerting one of a location specific alert when in the device is in that area.

Alerting in the Ad Space

The FIA reference guide is recommending ways, such as the one on harmonizing action oriented pictographs. These guidelines are mainly for those disseminating alerts through the Internet; including norms members should abide by when practising in this space.

The FIA Reference Service is an XML data structure with an ontology for maintaining various Internet Alerting related resources. These range from pictographs, document, so on and so forth. SSF had suggested that an object type designated for applications would be introduced. For example, the CAP message could carry the Javascript required for executing an application such as for playing the audio version of the message. Another could be that the recipients have options to select as a follow up action, such as acknowledging that "I AM SAFE".

Alerting on Ads is a nifty technology that leverages the capabilities of intelligent advertising technologies to distribute population and geographically targeted Ads in return for guaranteed impressions.

Validating event data

Stuart Weinstein (PTWC) mentioned in his talk at the CAP Implementation Workshop that International Warning Systems are coordinated by the United Nations through the UNESCO/IOC. He emphasized that it would be good if the various seismic monitoring and detection centres responsible for the various regions (shaded in the the map) could exchange the event specific data such as the depth, magnitude, pitch, displacement, etc to apply the Centroid Moment Tensor Model to forecast tsunamis in real-time.

Various stakeholders at the CAP Code-fest, interested in this topic, formed a group to discuss the design approach towards standardizing and verifying such data. When the seismic stations alert the other institutions around the world, they could include the event specific data in a CAP with a URL pointing to repository holding the nested data. Thereby, those who wish to process that data could utilize them.

The consensus of the group was to begin outlining an ontology with the earthquake data as means for testing the first developments. SSF's Standards and Interoperability Committee members: Dominic Konig and Nuwan Waidyanatha will take the lead in developing the blueprints. The goal is to develop it to a level of maturity that a stakeholder like Google would host the "validator".

Concluding remarks

The CAP Code-fest brought together the right number of people to manage such a productive event; where everyone had an opportunity take home some knew piece of knowledge. Looking forward to supporting future CAP Code-fests.